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Since the San Jacinto earthquake of 1899, earthquakes 
causing five or more deaths have struck California eight times 
about once every ten years .-1 Three of these quakes were near enough 
_/ John H. Wiggins and Donald F. Moran , Earthquake Safety in the 
City of Long Beach Based on the Concept of "Balanced Risk," J. H. 
Wiggins Co., 1971, p. C-9 . 
to maj or population centers to cause extensive damage and loss of 
life: San Francisco in 1906, Long Beach in 1933, and San Fernando 
in 1971. 
Each major earthquake in California -- particular ly the 
1933 and 1971 events -- catalyzed significant changes in public 
policies to defend against and respond to a repetition of the 
past disaster. Defensive policies include seismic resist ivity 
standards for buildings and dams, and since 1906 -- and especially 
* The research reported in this paper was financed in part by the 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory out of funds provided by the National Aero­
nautics and Space Administration and in part by the National Science 
Foundation program of Research Applied to National Needs, grant number 
APR75-16566. The authors are grateful for the information about 
existing disaster plans supplied by officials in the California Office 
of Emergency Services, the County of Los Angeles, Orange County, and 
the cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach , and for the comments on an 
earlier draft by Jack Hirshleiffer and Arnold Meltsner. 
since 1933 - - several California communities, most notably the 
City of Long Beach, have developed the most rigorous, complex 
building codes in the country. Responsive policies cover 
2 
planning and training oriented to providing effective, speedy 
relief services to a disaster-stricken community. Since 1971, 
when coordination of relief efforts proved to be a major problem, 
local government in California, prodded by the state Office of 
Emergency Services, has engaged in more extensive relief 
planning than was the case in the past. 
The principal purpose of this paper is to establish 
an analytical framework for assisting disaster relief planner� 
in assessing the effectiveness of existing plans and devising 
realistic allocations of responsibilities among relief organi­
zations, The paper builds on an earlier tradition of disaster 
studies: while major earthquakes are relatively rare events, 
major disasters are not, and the patterns of physical and 
psychological damage to disaster victims have been well docu­
mented. -/ The environment in which planning and relief ;: 
-1The classic work in this area is by C. Fritz, e. g. 
"Disasters Compared in Six American Communities, " Human 
Organization 16, Summer 1957; and " Disaster," in R. Martin and 
R. A .  Nisbet, eds., Contemporary Social Problems, New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, & World , Inc., 1961. S ee also the references 
in section 1 of this paper. 
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organizations must operate, including the nature and extent of 
damage an earthquake might cause and the likely behavioral 
response of both members of relief organizations and the client 
population, is fairly predictable. The first section of this 
paper is concerned with the immediate post-earthquake environ-
ment, and in particular with the behavior of the disaster victims. 
The second section focuses on the likely behavior of 
relief organizations immediately following an earthquake. It 
contains an economic analysis of the incentives facing planners 
before an earthquake strikes and an organization-theoretic 
analysis of the hierarchical structure and operating experiences 
that agencies will carry over from their normal activities. The 
third section examines the exis�ing plans for responding to an 
earthquake in Southern California. Its main purpose is to 
determine whether the assumptions that are implicit in the plan 
about the extent and nature of damage and the behavior of indi-
viduals and organizations during relief operations are consistent 
with the findings .in the first two sections. In several respects, 
the plans are found to ignore certain criticial features of 
the likely post-earthquake environment and response capability 
of relief organizations. Some sugges tions are offered for '­
improving plans to take account of these factors. 
1. THE EARTHQUAKE PLANNING ENVIRONMENT 
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Fritz has concluded that four disaster characteristics 
in fluence the behavioral responses of individuals after the event: 
1. The speed of the event. 
2. The nature of the event - e.g. its frequency, control-
ability arid predictability. 
3. The physical scope, destructiveness, and intensity of 
of the event . 
4. The duration of the threat. -/ 
-'c. Fritz, 1957. See also Dynes, Quarantelli, and Kreps, 
A Perspective on Disaster Planning, Defense Civil Preparedness. 
In the absence of accurate earthquake predictions, a major 
earthquake fits into this categorization as the type of disaster 
which causes maximal psychological damage to victims. 
The physical damage from recent major earthquakes is 
described in numerous books and essays. The striking physical 
characteristics of an earthquake include no or negligible 
forewarning, widespread damage but prior uncertainty as to the 
exact nature of the damage -- e.g. , floods, fires, or collapsed 
buildings and their locations -- and loss of communications 
facilities.-1 Given this type of event, a "disaster profile" 
_/ Of particular interest in eva luatin g Los Angeles plans 
are the books on Los lngeles earthquakes. See, e.g., Olson, 
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"Individual and Organizational Dimensions of the San Fernando 
Earthquake, " in M. Murphy (Scientific Coordinator), San Fernando, 
California, Earthquake of February 9, 1971, U. S. Department of 
Commerce, 1973, Vol. 11; Paul Jennings, ed. , Engineering Features 
of the San Fernando Earthquake February 9, 1971, California 
Institute of Technology, 1971; Hypothetical earthquakes are. 
discussed in A Study of Earthquake Losses in the Los Angeles, 
California Area, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration U. S. Department of Commerce, 1973. A complete bibliography 
is beyond the scope of this paper: for a more general cataloguing 
of the literature, see G. White and J. Haas, Assessment of 
Research on Natural Hazards, MIT Press, 1975 . 
of the victims can be pieced together from the numerous 
psychological and sociological studies.-/ Almost universal ' 
_I See, in particular, J. Hirshleiffer, Disaster and Recovery: 
a Historical Survey, Memorandum, RM-3079-PR, The RAND Corporation: 
Santa Monica, California, April, 1963; T. Scudder, "Possible 
Applications of Relocation Theory to Earthquake Response," 
Caltech (mimeo) , 1975; Chenault, Engler, and Nordlie, Social and 
Behavioral Factors in the Implementation of Local Survival and 
Recovery Activities, Human Sciences Research, Inc. : McLean, 
Virginia, August, 1967; P. Smith and L. Breger , "Psychological 
Reactions to Environmental Disasters with Special Reference to 
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Earthquakes, " Caltech (mimeo) 1975; Fritz, 1957; Dynes, et al. 
1972. 
agreement exists about the behavior of the disaster victims. 
They will not pan:lc, and disorientation is extremely rare . 
Rather, they tend to pursue constructive activities and immedi-
ately begin relief activities within the community . A strong 
sense of community identification is generated. This is accompanied 
by a strong tie among the "in-group" versus "outsiders, " and 
distrust of strangers. Severe damage leads to reordered values 
among the populace, who will in general rank the safety and 
welfare of the family first, and then concern for the immediate 
community. There is disagreement about the capacity of the victims 
for undertaking innovative behavior. Scudder questions their 
ability to do so while they are under severe stress. What 
innovation does occurr appears to come from within the community 
and to be directed at community problems. In general, an 
outsider will not be able to reorganize activities immediately 
following the disaster. 
The implications of this profile for planning are 
fairly obvious. The planner is uncertain about the extent and 
location of damages, and may lack communication facilities. 
Relying on local communities to coordinate efforts according to 
a previously unused plan is unrealistic. Corrdination between 
the various disaster-hit communities is unlikely. How the 
Los Angeles planning agencies now address these problems is 
discussed in the last section of the paper. The historical 
record abounds with examples of delayed or frustrated relief, 
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inhibited coordination efforts and inter-community communication 
that can be traced to this disaster profile. 
An example from the San Fernando earthquake was the 
inability of relief organizations to coordinate their operations 
at the collapsed Veteran's Administration Hospital. "Most 
apparent was the fact that the local, State, and Federal agencies 
that were involved conducted their emergency activities inde-
pendently of each other at a time when team effort or coordination 
would have been mutually helpful. This was evidenced by the 
almost total lack of communication among the agencies." _/ The 
_/ Report of the Los Angeles County Earthquake Commission, 
San Fernando Earthquake, February 9, 1971, November 1971, p. 21. 
Los Angeles Fire Department discovered the heavy damage at the 
hospital by a helicopter reconnaissance flight at 7:25 a. m. and 
immediately dispatched units to the hospital. The District 
Engineer of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers learned of the 
damage from a commercial television broadcast at 7:45 a.m., but 
could not reach the scene of the disaster until shortly after 
9:00 a.m. The County fire department became aware of the event 
at 9:05 a . m. ,  and the Sheriff's Department , the last of the 
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relevant· ·agencies to learn of it, heard at 10:30. Eventually 
all of these groups appeared, but the initial communications 
foul-u.P · h.indered further coordinated activities .-1
I . - Report o f  the Los Angeles County Earthquake Commission ,
San Fernando Earthquake, February 9 ,  1971, November 1971, p .  21. 
A particularly vivid exampte of the "in-group " -
"outsider" syndrome is the case of three relief efforts after 
the 1976 Guatemala earthquake. _/ · Nadel contrasts the relief 
-'G. Nadel , "Guatemala After the Terremoto, " in Atlantic, 
Vol 238, No. 1, July 1976, pp. 14-21. 
efforts of three agencies that were involved in housing recon-
struction. Despite widespread damage, housing was not a particularly 
vital problem in many of the Guatemala� villages . By the time the 
relief agencies arrived, most of the villagers had made satisfactory 
temporary arrangements for housing. Nevertheless, two agencies -
the Guatemalan army and CARE - had preconceived relief ideas 
which they tried to press on villagers. The result was hostility 
and non-cooperation from the villagers and, in some cases, 
totally wasted efforts. The army, for instance, "put up a refugee 
camp which became an instant ghost town • • •  There weren't many in 
San Martin who considered themselves refugees.•L-/ The third
-1Nadel, p. 19 
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agency - OXFAM -· contented itself with educating villagers on 
methods of building seismically resistent huts. While the 
results were not immediate, Nadel notes that the effects of 
the program were certainly longer-lasting, and addressed real 
problems. The approach by the other agencies led to total 
lack of communication and impact as the communities closed 
themselves off from outsiders. 
2. A PERSPECTIVE ON MUNICIPAL SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS 
Major earthquakes produce radical changes in the 
environmental conditions of relief agencies. They must 
r espond to unusual conditions, and coordinate efforts with 
unfamiliar agencies, while suff,ering from the earthquake 
themselves. The organizations providing relief are themselves 
disrupted, particularly in the crucial few hours immediately 
following an earthquake .-1 Hirshleiffer notes that following·· 
_IR. Dynes , .Organized Behavior in Disasters, Disaster 
Research Center Monomgraph Series #3, Ohio State University: 
Columbus, Ohio, 1969 . 
a disaster agencies may act rapidly under the right conditions . 
·., 
"If these groups are well-trained and prepared, they may perform 
prodigies; if not, they may not function at all. 11-1
_/Hirshleiffer, p. 7 
Organizations differ in their ability to cope with 
the post-earthquake environment . As Hirshleiffer and other 
authors note, usually the agencies with prior experience in 
emergency services or that normally coordinate efforts respond 
most effectively immediately following a disaster .-1 The 
-1see also Dacy and Kunreuther, The Economics of Natural 
Disasters; Implications for Fefileral Policy, The Free Press: 
New York, N.Y ., 1969. 
usual organization-theoretic rationale for this phenomena is 
that the organizations' characteristics -- in particular its 
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standard operating procedures -- are expensive to adopt and take 
time to develop . -/ In other words, procedures are fixed in 
-1see, generally, J .  Mar�h and H. Simon, Organizations, 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc.: New York, N . Y. ,  1958 ,  Ch. 7.
the short run. 
This argument is buttressed by the standard economic 
formulation of production functions. A municipal service 
organization has two general categories of tasks for which it 
must prepare. The first is the provision of normal services 
and the second is disaster relief. Though the two types of tasks 
are usually related, they are not identical. Since resources 
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available to the organization are limited, a trade-off exists 
between greater capacity for normal operations and greater 
capacity for disaster response. 
One manifestation of this trade-off is the decision-
making structure chosen by the agency. The agency selects a 
structure somewhere on the continuum from totally centralized 
to completely decentralized decision making .-/ The advantages 
I See J. Marschak and R .  Radner, An Economic Theory of 
Teams, Yale University Press: New Haven, Connecticut, 1972.
of a centralized organization stem from economies of scale in 
collecting and processing information. The sources of these 
scale economies are numerous, but among the more important are 
the following. First , a policy decision or a set of operating 
instructions is a kind of public good. Focusing responsibility 
at a single source allows the simultaneous solution of problems 
common to several subunits in the agency and hence economizes 
on total decision-making effort . Second, centralization allows 
specialization of decision-making tasks to a greater degree than 
does decentralization, for the traditional resasons expressed first 
by Adam Smith . Third, a centralized authority is able to deal 
more effectively with the allocation of reasons among subunits, 
in part because its actions do not require the attainment of 
voluntary consensus among the units and in part because a 
centraliz ed sys tem requires fewer communications links to 
as sure that allocational deci sions are based upon complete 
information. 
The advantages of decentralization s tern from its 
avoidance of the more extensive corrununications system that 
a hierarchical organization requires. A communication sys tem 
has direc t  cos t s  associated with cons tructing and operating 
it, and an indirect cost in that it causes delays in decision­
rnaking while information is transmit ted to decision-makers 
and instructions are transmitted to functional units. An 
organization that relies upon an extensive information sys tem 
is vulnerable to errors and distortions in the data available 
to it , particularly in the short run when information cannot 
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as easily be checked for accuracy. In particular, a decentralized 
agency may perform vas tly bet ter in any emergency, and especially 
after an earthquake when communication and transportation 
systems are disrupted . The centralized agency will perform bet ter 
if speed is not es sential , communication is good , and resources 
mus t  be allocated among a number of subunit s. 
Other s tructural characteristics, such as the degree 
of job routinization, can be identified which similarly effect 
the output o f  the agency. The point is that efficient delivery 
of one type of service may preclude another. If an agency 
concentrates on normal services it may be inefficient at pro­
viding emergency services. Planning is supposed to counteract 
this tendency: theoretically, a good plan is a subs titute 
for actual experience. Unfortunately , an agency has an 
incentive to specialize in the provision of normal services, 
which usually means that the agency does not plan seriously 
for the delivery of disaster services, 
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An agency mus t  choose its resource allocation in the 
face of the trade-of f  between normal and emergency services. 
Because earthquakes are such rare events, agencies are likely 
to concentrate on producing normal services without much regard 
to the effec t s  of their choices on earthquake response. Despite 
the importance of the services performed by an agency during a 
disas ter , the principle purpose of the organization is associated 
with its normal operations. T�e political process which gave 
birth to the agency tends to have a short time horizon. Elected 
o f ficials, seeking , reelection , will focus on normal services
which are more likely to provide immediate payof fs. If the 
political time horizon is relatively short , the bes t  bet i:s 
obviously that no earthquake will occur. Consequently , unles s  
officials are particularly concerned with the pos sibilities o f  
a n  earthquake , inves tment i n  preparation for emergency operations -
may be viewed as unimportant since it probably will not yield 
any tangible benefits for which they can claim credit. 
Individual employees in relief agencies face a similar 
set of incentives. First, since political leaders determine 
agency budgets , they will transmit their preferences for normal 
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operations to agencies in the budgetary process. Second, agency 
personnel have separate reasons to focus on normal operations. 
If the expected length of employment with the organization is 
only a few years (even a dozen or so) , employees may consider 
any time invested in familiarizing themselves with contingency 
plans or preparing in other ways for emergency related services 
as wasted since the likelihood is small that a major earthquake 
will occur while they occupy their current positions. 
The behavior of existing agencies is generally con-
sistent with the preceding analysis. For example, plans for 
post-earthquake evacuation operations in Los Angeles were 
developed before the 1971 earthquake, but a captain in the 
police force who was instrumental in the evacuation of the area 
below the Van Norman Dam revealed that he had not been informed 
of any plans for evacuation, emergency centers for receiving 
evacuees, institutionalized methods of agency coordination, or 
allocation of local resources.-/
_
I 
Interview with a police department official, July 28, 1975.
The preceding analysis leads to a paradox: Planning 
is essential, since an organization cannot be expected to change 
form immediately and effectively respond to new demands after an 
earthquake • .  On the other hand, planning requires resources, 
which are invested at the expense of normal operations. Consequently, 
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agencies are not likely to plan for disasters in the face of 
this trade-off, and political officials are unlikely to provide 
funds that are earmarked for that purpose. 
Since the 1971 San Fernando earthquake, planning has 
received mor.e serious consideration throughout California. 
Certainly the incentives of legislators, at least those from 
areas affected by the earthquake, were changed by the earthquake. 
The change has led to increased planning for disasters at all 
levels of government . The next section the effectiveness and 
practicality of thes� plans are considered. 
3. CALIFORNIA DISASTER PLANS 
The state of California has an extensive hierarchy of 
emergency plans, most of which have evolved from civil defense 
organizations that in the early years of the Cold War developed 
contingency plans to cope with the devastation of a nuclear attack. 
At the center of the planning activity is the California Office of 
Emergency Services (OES) , which, among other duties, is responsible 
for state disaster planning, coordinating state disaster relief 
activities, and encouraging and assisting local governments in 
preparing for all types of disasters .-1 Most local plans are 
_/OES responsibilities are detailed in the State of California 
Emergency Plan, Office of Emergency Services, published in several 
parts from 1970 to 1973,. especially Part I, pp. 2-3, and Part II, 
pp. 7, 13-14. 
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strongly influenced by OES, and even incorporate verbatim passages 
from state planning documents . 
The basic organizational structure for mobilizing disaster 
relief is enunciated in the state plan.-1 It establishes several 
-1The state plan is enunciated in a series of documents published 
by OES. The most important for natural disasters are: State of 
�alifornia Emergency Plan -- Part I: Basic Emergency Plan , 1970; 
Part II: Peacetime Plan, 1972; Part III: Compendium of Legislation 
and References, 1973; California Fire and Rescue Emergency Plan, 1972. 
hierarchical levels of decision-making, at the top of which sits 
the Governor and OES who are assigned the tasks of allocating state 
supplies and resources, acquiring Federal assistance when appropriate, 
and coordinating relations among lower levels of the hierarchy. ·OES 
has divided the state into six regions, which in turn are divided 
into county-wide areas.--1 The state OES office deals with its regional 
-1state of California Emergency Plan -- Part II, pp. 7-12. 
offices, the regional OES office with the county organizations, and 
each county organization with the individual jurisdictions -- cities, 
special districts and the county government -- within its area. The 
county organization is operated by the jurisdictions that are members 
of it, not by OES. The guiding principle of the state emergency 
response system is that multijurisdictional activities will move up 
the hierarchical levels of responsibilities only as far as is 
necessary to provide an effective response to the disaster. A local 
government will ask for assistance from its neighbors through the 
county coordinating a uthority only if coping with the disaster is 
beyond its abilities and resources. By the same token, the county 
authority appeals for regional help, and the region for statewide 
assistance, only when it is incapable of dealing with the problem 
with its own resources.-1 
-1 For a detailed and important application of these principles, 
see California Fire and Rescue Emergency Plan, pp. 2-6. 
Requests for mutual aid can follow complicated paths 
through the organizational hierarchy.-/ If a local government 
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-1For details, see Emergency Assistance Guide to State and 
Federal Resources, OES, Emergency Assitance Programs Division 
(undated), p. 1, and California Fire and Rescue Emergency Plan, p. 24. 
requests mutual aid, the plan calls for the request to be made first 
to the adjacent jurisdictions or, if it is operating, to the county 
authority. The latter, when receiving the request, determines 
whether it is valid. Assuming that it is, the county official then 
passes the request either to other jurisdictions in the county or, 
if their resources are otherwise committed, to the regional coordinator. 
Either of these evaluates the request again, with the latter having 
the option to pass the request either to other counties in the region 
or to the state OES office -- for still further evaluation. At any 
stage along the way, the request may legally be refused if all 
resources at that level are committed or if the requesting authority 
is deemed capable of further self-help. 
Most relief resources are in the control of local 
governments and, as a result , mutual aid is crucial for dealing 
effectively with a major disaster. State, regional and county plans 
are devoted in large measure to defining the terms and conditions 
of mutual aid agreements. Since government officials are reluctant 
to release resources that are paid for by their constituents to 
another jurisdiction, the terms of .mutual aid are rigorous: a 
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government must have exhausted its .own resources and still find 
unmet demands for its services in order to justify a call for mutual 
aid.-/ A consequence of this reluctance is that each agency normally 
_IA key link in the organizational hierarchy, the county-wide 
coordinating authority, must be activated only if the disaster is 
related to a state of war. In peacetime emergencies , which include 
an earthquake , the county authority is voluntary. If the county 
organization is not activated, a local government is expected to 
ask for help from neighboring jurisdictions before appealing to the 
regional office of OES. (See, for example, Basic Emergency Operations 
Plan, Los Angeles County Operational Area, Interim Edition, 1975, 
p. v.) While the county authority is voluntary, assistance from 
other jurisdictions -- called mutual aid -- is mandatory once the 
Governor declares a state of emergency. Since the county organizatiJn 
obviously facilitates the coordination of mutual aid requests and 
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assessments of local resources , its voluntary nature is likely to be 
unimportant it iG inconceivable that it would not be activated 
should a major earthquake strike . 
retains control of all of its resources as long as it has unmet 
demands for its services. For example , the State of California 
Department of Public Works can assist in "non-highway engineering 
and construction work • • • to the extent that the ability to maintain 
the state highway system is not impaired., _/ This explicitly 
-1state of California Emergency Plan, Part II, p. 19. 
establishes highway maintenance as the highest priority use of the 
department's heavy equipment and trained operational personnel, 
' which also could be useful for heavy rescue operations or clearing 
: local streets. 
For similar political reasons, local governments are 
reluctant to relinquish their authority over public services in 
their jurisdictions. Consequently, mutual aid resources, including 
relief personnel, are controlled by the receiving government until 
the need for them abates . County, regional and state emergency 
coordinators serve as neutral referees, deciding which localities 
.need help and which can provide it, thereby relieving some of the 
interjurisdictional suspicions and rivalries that naturally are 
associated with the uncompensated transfer of resources and authority 
over personnel. 
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In part, the highly structured, procedurally freighted 
emergency response system is a consequence of the allocation of 
responsibilities by level of government in normal operations . Loca l 
governments provide police and fire protection, repair water systems 
and roads, and operate public health and welfare agencies, and these 
services are at the center of emergency response plans. The need 
for a complex mechanism of coordination arises because the level 
of government with the resources is not the appropriate level for 
organizing a response to a major d.isaster. But the complex 
organization enacts a cost in delayed response. 
Local Government Plans 
The companions to the state emergency plan are the plans 
promulgated by county, city and s pecial district governments,_/
-1 In the Los Angeles area, Orange County, Los Angeles County, 
the City of Los Angeles and the City of Long Beach have rather 
detailed plans; most jurisdictions do not . 
Reflecting state guidelines, these plans usually e�tablish Emergency 
Operating Centers (EOC) where local government officials will congre-
gate to direct relief operations and to coordinate activities with 
other governmental units. While the city plans often create what 
superficially appears to be an entirely new governmental organizat ion 
chart for dealing with the disaster, the changes are for the most 
part cosmetic. For example, the Long Beach Plan establishes a 
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Fire and Rescue Service and a Law Enforcement and Traffic Control 
Service, but the former consists of the Fire Department augmented 
by a few employees of the Parks Department, while the latter is the 
Police Department augmented by a few employees from the office 
of the City Prosecutor.-/ 
_/City of Long Beach, California, Emergency Plan for Citizen 
Safety, City Council Resolution C-21063, December 10, 1971.
Local government plans normally contain descriptions of 
the kinds of problems each emergency service organi zation is 
likely to face, the lines of authority within the local government, 
the coordinators with whom each director of an emergency service 
should maintain contact, and lines of succession should key personnel 
be unavailable to perform their assigned duties when the disaster 
strikes. The plans normally do not define the responsibilities 
and likely activities of personnel below the level of assistants 
to the directors of each of the emergency services. As recommended 
in the state plan ,-1 each agency is given the responsibility for 
-1state of California Eme rgency Plan, Part I, pp. 9-10.
·working out detailed operational plans, a task that is for the most 
part neglected. In short, the existing plans are guides for the
top level officials of governments for making centralized decis ions , 
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for keeping informed about the sc9pe of the disaster, and for 
coordinating activities with decision-makers at equal or higher 
levels of the state emergency plan. They are essentially an 
administrative, as compared to operational, response to state and 
federal requirements regarding mutual aid agreements and disaster 
assistance programs. As such, they stand as testimonies to the 
lack of incentive local officials perceive to plan an effective 
response to a major earthquake. 
Planning for Politics, Not Disasters 
The existing structure of disaster plans can be viewed as 
the resolution of a series of political and bureaucratic conflicts' 
among the organizations involved in emergency preparedness. OES 
was created to spur localities to engage in activities that they 
would otherwise probably largely ignore. But given little real 
authority or resources, OES could not shift control of emergency 
response from these same local units. Instead, it could only impose 
on localities a complex, highly stratified, hierarchical coordination 
system that could be activated if local governments were unable 
to fend for themselves. Unfortunately, this hierar�hy is, from top 
to bottom, a prototype of an organization designed to function least 
effectively during a disaster of the scope of a major earthquake, as 
is revealed when i ts s tructural and oper ational aspects are measured
against the analytical template provided in the prededing sections. 
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The analysis in Section 2 predicts that organizations 
with highly centralized decision-making and routinized procedures 
are most likely to suffer disruption when faced with an unusual 
environmental condition. In addition, unfamiliar procedures 
take time to master. Moreover, the empirical observations that 
individuals under extreme stress will not undertake new patterns 
of behavior at the request of strangers suggests that unfamiliar 
hierarchical structures and operating procedures will be even 
less quickly mastered than normal by lower-level personnel. 
Yet this is precisely the type of organization that the various 
state and local plans have created. 
An obvious conclusion is that disaster response 
organizations should be more d�centralized with fewer hierar­
chical levels, along the lines of fire departments and building 
inspection agencies. Then the initial response to a disaster 
would be more effective because internal disruption would be 
reduced. Such a recommendation is, however, surely futile. 
The structure of disaster relief organizations is chosen to 
be consistent with producing the normal service of each agency 
most efficiently while retaining existing patterns of authority 
among agencies and jurisdictions, since' only this choice is 
consistent with the incentives facing the components of the 
response organization. Unless these incentives change, a 
planner's recommendation that agencies and local governments 
restructure themselves so that they are bet ter prepared for 
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earthquake response -- a structure which also implies less 
efficient production of normal service -- is likely to be 
ignored, and, at least from the point of view of local officials, 
for good reason. 
Given that organizations are not likely to be struc­
tured so as to optimize their response to the demands of a 
disaster , at least knowing which agencies are likely to be most 
crippled by a disaster can be useful in structuring the relief 
assignments among agencies. Specifically, an existing agency 
should not be assigned a relief function just because of the 
conceptual similarity of the relief responsibility to the normal 
services of the agency . Tasks should be allocated on the basis 
of which organization will be able to perform these tasks, 
given the training of its personnel and its resources, structure 
and operating procedure, rather than on the basis of training 
and resources alone, 
Search and Rescue 
Search and rescue plans provide an illustrative example 
of the problems that can result if conceptual similarity is the 
sole basis of task assignment. Local plans comm�nly assign both 
fire-fighting and rescue activities to fire department since both 
are normal departmental activities. But the rescue part of the 
fire department's responsibilities is, in both normal operations 
and the majority of emergencies, a secondary or auxiliary activity. 
As a result, the natural inclination of the decision makers in the 
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fire department will be to focus on fires and threats of fires . 
In a major earthquake, this could lead to a serious error in the 
initial response to the disaster, as in fact happened in Anchorage 
in 1964.-/
_/ Immediately after the Alaska earthquake an ad hoc 
committee of city officials decided that the police should guard 
heavily damaged areas against looting and the fire department 
should deploy itself to prevent a conflagration. But no incidents 
of looting were reported, and fire personnel, after putting out 
the few minor fires, remained in their stations on "full alert". 
Not until the next day did search and rescue operations begin. 
See Yutzy and Haas, "Disaster.and Functional Priorities in 
Anchorage," in Committee on the Alaskan Earthquake, The Great 
Alaska Earthquake of 1964, Vol . 7, Human Ecology, National 
Academy of Sciences, 1970.
The implication is that rescue operations ought to be 
severed administratively from fire-fighting . Since fire department 
resources are needed in both activities, someone other than fire -
authorities should allocate resources between fire-fighting and 
rescue. This can be expected to be opposed vigorously by fire 
authorities, who will see it as a threat and even an attempt 
by others to claim the political rewards for effective response
activities by fire department personnel. 
Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that existing 
emergency organizations are not likely to do well in search 
and rescue operations on a massive scale. In fact, because 
local plans are of ten drawn by committees composed of repre-
sentatives from normal government agencies, search and rescue 
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responsibilities often get overlooked in emergency preparedness. 
For example, the emergency plan for the City of Los Angeles 
does not assign primary responsibility for search and rescue to 
any emergency service agency; the police, the public works 
department, the medical care unit, and the fire department all 
have some aspect of search and rescue as an auxiliary task . -/ 
_/ Emergency Plan for the Organization and Operation of the 
Civil Defense and Disaster Corps, City of Los Angeles, 1972. 
No one at the city's EOC will be principally concerned about 
organizing effective search and rescue activities.-/ The Los 
_/ The state plan does recommend the creation of "special 
purpose units having no pre-emergency counterparts • • •  to perform 
t hose activities peculiar to major emergencies." (State of 
California Emergency Plan, Part I, p .  9.) Except for the EOC, 
local ities rarely plan for the establishment of such organizations, 
particularly when to do so would strip an existing agency of one 
of its existing , if secondary, responsibilities. 
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Angeles County planning guide lists the organization of light 
search and rescue operations twelfth and heavy rescue fourteenth 
on the priority list for the fire department, the latter below 
debris clearance and both below all fire-related tasks, including 
reports to the EOG about fire-fighting activities. Search and 
rescue does not appear on the police priority list.-1 
_I Emergency Operations Guide, Los Angeles County Earthquake 
Planning Project, Feder al Disaster Assistance Administration and 
California Office of Emergency Services, 1975. 
Planning Novel Activities 
Another implication of the preceding sections is that 
mechanisms for conducting novel activities must be in place prior 
to the earthquake, whether the mechanisms are simply machinery 
for interagency coordination that is not practiced normally, or 
different methods for performing traditional tasks. Organizations 
are not likely to invent these mechanisms immediately after an 
earthquake. Regardless of the nature of the damage resulting 
from an earthquake, likely patterns o,f interaction and communica-
tion among departments are predictable -- e.g., the police and 
water departments must coordinate action for evacuation of areas 
threatened by weakened dams. The list of possible interactions 
is long and difficult to construct on the spot. Making certain 
that individuals in relief agencies know whom to contact in other 
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departments or jurisdictions and what their capabilities are 
can be extremely productive. 
Existing plans implicitly recognize this requirement 
of good disaster preparedness by establishing the EOG, where 
all relevant service chiefs will be located. Many plans go 
further to provide directories of state, federal and local 
officials who may be useful but.who are not scheduled to be 
represented at the EOG. But the plans are not rich in informing 
participants in EOG operations of the kinds of coordination 
problems they will face . The most detailed list of possible 
problems and actions for each service director is contained 
in the operations guide for Los Angeles county.-/ While this 
_I Emergency Operation Guide , Los Angeles County Earthquake 
Planning Project, Federal Disaster Assistance Administration and 
California Office of Emergency Services, July, 1975. 
document provides a checklist of emergency actions each service 
organization should be prepared to take, it is mute on the inter­
service coordination problems that might arise. 
Evidence from the moderate 1971 earthquake supports the 
view that coordination will not be easy. Fire departments are 
the agencies that are mos t  likely to exhibit "model" coordination 
because of their long his tory of mutual aid and cooperation. 
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The experience at the Veterans' Hospital mentioned in Section 1 
points otherwise: no agency including fire departments, communi­
cated the severity of the damage at the hospital to the other 
agencies, and each initiated an independent search and rescue 
mission. 
Emergency planning agencies, being aware of the 
uncertainties and coordination problems following a disaster, 
have focused on mechanisms for increasing the flow of information 
to the central command centers. For example, the state emergency 
plan emphasizes the importance of getting good information to
relevant officials, allowing them to communicate about the 
implications of the information and the strategic alternatives, 
and communicating decisions back to the field.-/ The plan 
_/ State of California Emergency Plan, Part I, Attachment 
Direction and Control, Office of Emergency Services, 1970, p. 1. 
recommends that key emergency officials be assembled in a single 
site as "the most effective and economical way to accomplish 
direction and control under emergency condition." The Los Angeles, 
County preparedness activities carry out this general policy by 
focusing on adding to communications capabilities.-/ Implicit in 
_
/ 
"Chief Adminstrative Officer's Progress Report to the 
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors: Implementat ion of Recommendations
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of the Earthquake Commission and the Earthquake Task Forces, San 
Fernando Earthquake: February 9, 1971, " Los Angeles County, 1973. 
this viewpoint are the assumptions that hierarchical, centralized 
organizations are required for effective response to a disaster 
and that such an organization can maintain sufficient communication 
capacity to transmit complete information about the nature of 
the disaster and the resources available to each functional unit.: 
The Problem of Disrupted Communications 
Most plans do not deal seriously with, or even consider , 
the problems that might arise if the communications system is disrupted 
so that the assembled officials receive little or no information. The 
state plan, for example, contains a description of the existing 
communications resources, but no discussion of possible predisaster 
planning in case these resources are damaged or prove inadequate.-1 
_/State of California Emergency Plan: Attachment E --
Communications System, Office of Emergency Services, 1970; 
Many existing planning documents explicitly assume that 
communications facilities will not be severely disrupted by a major
earthquake. For example, the Emergency Plan of the Los Angeles 
Department of Building and Safety assumes that "damage in the City 
will not disrupt, for any period of time, normal connnunications 
and access to work headquarters."-
/ 
Employees are provided with the 
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_/Policy Order No. 33, Disaster Plan for the Department of 




Regular working hours 
(a) Office: personnel on duty in offices may be 
assigned other duties • • •  
(b) Field: personnel working in the field • • •  shall 
call their office for instructions. 
Off-duty hours 
(a) The General Manager, Executive Officer, Bureau Chiefs, 
District and Branch Office Managers shall report to 
their offices • • •  
(b) All other employees shall not report to their 
offices to perform field duties un7ess directed to do so by their field officers.-
-1�, P • 2. 
Similarly, the state utilities plan contains only one mention of field 
personnel: "The first duty of a utility employee is to report his 
location and availability to the manager or director at the emergency 
1 operating headquarters to which he is assigned."-/ Obviously the plans 
_/Utilities Emergency Plan, Office of Emergency Services, 1972, 
p. 5 . 
are relying on normal operation of the transportation and telephone 
systems; however the 19 7 1  earthquake, substantially more moderate than 
the worst case the plans are supposed to deal with effectively, led
to disruption of both the normal phone service and the emergency 
connnuil.ications system. Both were inoperative for most  of the day, 
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primarily because o f  in creased u s e  rather than physical damage due t o  
the earthquake . -
1 
T o  limit s t aff  t o  perform duties only upon 
I - Olson , p .  2 7 6 .  
directives from dis as ter officials means that many s taff members will, 
in fact, do nothing for many hours af ter the earthquake , and means 
that the number of staff members who will be deployed effectively for 
relief services will be inversely related to the magni tude of the 
disaster . 
Some . document s  do indicate that the twin planning 
characteris tics of reliance on communications and lack of s peci·fic 
preparednes s  directives to field personnel could prove to be severe 
shortcomings . For example, the federally organi zed planning proj ect 
for Los Angeles and Orange counties prepared a guide for local 
p lanning that poin ted ou t tha t repair of communications faci lities 
was . likely to be too time consuming to permit de cision-makers to




Earthguake Response Planning Guide, Los Angeles and Orange 
Counties Earthquake Planning Proj e c t , Federal Disas ter Assis tance 
Adminis tration and California Of fice of Emergency Services, 1975, p . 6 .  
The guide st ates that ef fective dis as ter response depends upon fieid 
personnel being well prepared for dis as ter ass ignments , y et points
out that mos t plans refer to field personnel in only vague terms 
and do not include planning exercises � 
33 
The reason for the rather opt imistic view tha t plans 
take of the viability of the emergency communicat ions sys tem i s  
related t o  the broad purpos e o f  the emergency planning document s 
and to the is sues di scus sed above with respect to the incentives 
faced by organizat ions that have relief respons ibilities . S tate 
and local emergency p lans are intended to cover all disas ters 
that s tre t ch the resources of a single j urisdic tion, from maj or 
f ires to nuclear attack . The plans are primarily des igned to 
deal with two extremes : fire and war emergencies ,  The lat ter 
emphasis arises because the s t ate law makes mandatory cooperative 
war emergency planning and relief operations by local government .  
The emphasis on fires ref lects the incidence of this particular 
type of emergency : brush and fores t  f ires that demand multi-
j ur isdict ional responses occur several times each year :l.n 
California ; mos t  of the five event s  per year that lead to calls 
for the assistance of the s tate O f f  ice of Emergency Services are
Fires .-
1 
The s tate plan observes that the mos t  "dire, pervasive 
_I S t ate of California Emergency Plan, Part Two : Peacet ime 
Emergency Plan ,  Office of Emergency Services, 197 2, p .  1 .  
and critical destructive force" "with which the peacetime mu s t
cope is  a maj or earthquake .-/ Yet the presump tion within this
-1oES damage data bear this out . The 1 9 7 1  San Fernando
Earthquake , moderate though it was, killed 64 people and caused 
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an estimated $553 million in damages. The worst fire season in 
California history, in 1970, caused an estimated $ 2 23 million in 
damages, with no report on deaths. See State of California 
Emergency Plan, Part II, Appendix. Planning Factors -- Peacetime 
Emergencies, pp . 1-4 . 
and other plans that communications services will not be inadequate 
and that an effective response system can be hierarchically 
structured reflects an implicit focusing of planning activities 
on the less severe disasters that lead to the most frequent demands 
for the services of emergency organizations . 
Decentralized Control of Relief Resources 
The preceding sections also have implications with 
respect to the storage and allocation of materials needed for 
disaster relief, such as medical supplies , food , water , etc . 
The issue for planners is to decide whether to store supplies in 
a central locat ion and have the central command unit allocate 
them on the basis of its informat ion about the extent of need in 
various parts of the community , or to store some supplies in 
numerous local caches and leave to local author itie� the responsi-
bility to allocate them as needed . The preceding analysis suggests 
that the latter is preferable . -/ The central agency is unlikely 
_/ Obviously this conc lus ion depend s upon the assumption 
that f ield personnel will be kept  informed of the location and 
to be aware of the full extent of need in each part o f  the 
community. Furthermore, it takes time to process all the 
available information before making allocative decisions, and 
time can mean many lives. Finally, if decentralized groups 
have resources , they need report to the command center only the 
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extent to wh ich their resources are insufficient. S ince most of 
the community is likely to suffer only moderate damage, this 
greatly reduces the information flow of the relief system .  
One impediment to adopt ing a more decentralized system 
of contro l and use of disaster resources -- an admitted source of 
the hierarchically struc tures, procedurally complex decis ion 
system the plans establish -- is the financial incentives state 
and local authorities have put in place for local governments .  
For example , the Long Beach plan specifically adopts different 
supply requisitioning procedures for disaster response because 
of the need to keep records that will make it possible to obtain 
federal disaster relief assistance . -/ S imilarly , much of the 
_/ City of Long Beach, p .  19 and Append ix l ,  p .  7 .
effort by OES to establish state and regional coordinating acti-
vities is a r esponse to the existing structure of control over
resources and f inances at the state and federal levels . 
Approaches to Improving Plans 
Most of the shor t comings of exis t ing plans are a 
natural response to the incentives facing administrat ive 
off i c ials . It follows that an improvement in planning can come 
about only if the incen t ives change . How can the incent ive 
s tructure be changed ? 
One pos s ibility is the provis ion of f inancial support 
for relevant d i saster preparedness ac t ivities from the a.ppro-
pr iate levels of government -- probably the s tate , s ince earth-
quake response will normally involve governments from mor e than 
a s ingle county , but rarely from out s ide the s tat e .  The s tate 
could pay for , and participate in , the op erat ions of a disaster 
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r e l i e f  depar tment of , say , county governments . These departments 
would have the r esources neces sary to provide p lanning and 1,l. 
training that involves f ield personnel , and the authority to  
claim the t ime of governmental employees in conventional agencies 
fire , public works and pol ice depar tments , for example -- for 
d isaster preparednes s activit ies . The d i saster agency would then 
a ssume control of emergency respons e  operat ions if the ranking 
local off i c ial d eclared a condit ion of emergency .  I t  would 
direct convent ional departments in activities related to their 
tradit iona l funct ion ; allocate personnel , equipment and supplies 
accord ing to p lans and exi s t ing contingencies ; and take principal 
respons ib il ity for response activities outs ide of the normal range 
of respons ibilities of exis t ing local agencies ,  such as mas s  care 
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of refugees and search and rescue operat ions . The organizat ion 
would , during the disas t er , be supergovernmental , able to 
control resources  of all local government s d irectly affected by 
the d i saster . 
The preced ing recommendat ion flies directly in the face 
of the presumpt ions in all exist ing plans . Each local government 
retains control of its cons tituent s ,  and each agency is responsible 
f or i t s  own d isas ter planning . Even the most sophisticated and 
realistic planning document , the r epor t  to the bi-county p lanning 
groups , accepts the premise of local control : "Because of the 
numbers of public and private agencies that operate in the two­
county ar ea , i t  is not feasible to d evelop · a s ingle ' plan ' for 
responding to earthquakes • • . •  Although the guide sugges t s  how the 
system should be organized , it does not sugge s t  how the ind ividual 
component s  of the sys tem should organize themselves . Mat ters of 
organiz ing and ass igning responsibility are int ernal problems 
that are the proper concern of the execut ives of  the var ious 
respons ible governmental and private agencies . • •  •L
/ 
Perhaps
_/ Earthquake Response Planning Guide , p .  1- 2 .
more than any s ingle factor , the polit ical cons traints  on disaster 
planning implicit in this statement ef fect ively guarantee a 
chaot ic , ineffective response when a maj or devastating earthquake 
s trike s .  
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This harsh conclusion does not apply in the same degree 
to all organizations: fire departments are well-prepared for the 
fire-fighting aspects of disaster response . Their preparedness 
is not due to frequent perusal and practice of a plan . Instead , 
the department will Jterform relatively well b ecause it will face 
demands in the post- earthquake environment that are similar to 
the demands it faces while carrying out its day-to-day activities . 
Such is not the case with all relief organizations . If citizens 
and government officials are serious about earthquake preparedness, 
they must come to grips with this problem. 
In the absence of mandatory planning requirements, 
overseen and paid for by the state, the spate of planning 
engendered by the San Fernando quake is likely to subside, for 
the public attention to earthquake�related prob lems will tend to 
abate as San Fernando fades into distant memory . By the_ time ' 
the next earthquake hits , existing plans may b e  forgotten and 
response may be no better than in the past . An example of this 
phenomenon is illustrated in a story about the great fire following 
the San Francisco earthquake of 1906. During the middle and late 
nineteenth century , several devastating fires hit San Francisco . 
In response, the city of San Francisco b uild numerous cisterns, so 
that if fire should break our when normal water supplies were 
disrupted, alternate source s would .  be available . ·By the turn of
the century , the loca t ion of mos t  of the cisterns had been 
forgotten ,  so they were of no use in attempts to s top the 
conflagrations following the earhquake .-1 A map of their 
_I Charles Boden, "San Francisco ' s  Cisterns, ." California 
Historical Quarterly, Vol.  15, No , 4 ( 1937 ) , pp. 1-13. 
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location i n  the hands of the fire department could have avoided 
this. More recently, the Packaged Disaster Hospitals provided 
b y  the federal government were of limited usefulness during the 
San Fernando earthquake b ecause their staffs lacked direction, 
and were not informed of the resources available in the units or 
even how to assemble them. -/ These experiences should give pause 
_I Olson, p .  285
to those who believe that the current experiences in planning ·: 1 
will have an important long-term impact on disaster relief . 
